Abstract: Existing theories that emphasize the significance of financial intermediation for economic development have not addressed two important empirical facts: (i) the relationship between financial and real activities depends crucially on the stage of development, and (ii) financial and industrial market structures vary widely across otherwise similar countries. To explain these observations, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model allowing for endogenous market structures in which financial deepening spurs real activity through intermediate product broadening. We show the possibility of multiple steady-state equilibria and characterize how these equilibria respond to various shocks. In particular, we examine the determinants of financial deepening, product broadening, the saving rate, the loan-deposit interest rate spread, and the degree of competitiveness of financial and product markets. We find that the dynamic interactions between financial and real activities depend critically on the synergy of financial and industrial competitiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of financial intermediation in determining the level of real economic activity has been known for some time. Walter Bagehot (1915) was the first to emphasize the links between the real and financial sectors, and the crucial nature of these links was further elucidated by Schumpeter (1934) and Knight (1951) . In recent years a growing body of empirical work has been devoted to establishing relationships between financial intermediation and economic development. The newer literature has documented two key observations. First, the correlation between financial and real activity depends on the stage of development and may in some cases be negative, which we refer to as "stage-dependent financial development."
1 Second, the degrees of competitiveness of financial and product markets vary significantly across otherwise similar countries, which we refer to as "heterogenous market structures." 2 Most of the recent theoretical papers examining the relationship between financial intermediation and economic development have focused on the emergence of financial intermediation in dynamic general-equilibrium models based on the growth-promoting role of such intermediation in overcoming market frictions. While these models have provided significant insights into the relationship between the financial and real sectors, 2 3 As originally illuminated by Gurley and Shaw (1960) financial intermediaries exist to transform securities issued by firms into securities that have desirable characteristics for final savers. As Fama (1980) pointed out, when the financial sector is perfectly competitive and there are no frictions, intermediation is inessential to real activity. To ensure an active role for financial intermediaries, technological frictions such as asset indivisibility and imperfect risk diversification are usually considered. Of course, financial intermediaries can arise to overcome incentive frictions due to asymmetric information with respect to borrowers and incompleteness of financial contracts (Townsend, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) . See Pagano (1993) , Galetovic (1994) and Becsi and Wang (1997) for critical literature surveys. 4 The funds pooling idea is, also, explored by Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) in their study of the workings of the ROSCA and by Cooley and Smith (1996) in their analysis of indivisible assets. they are unable to address the aforementioned empirical facts. To explain these important observations, we develop the idea that financial deepening (or increases in the ratio of intermediated loans to output) spurs real activity through production specialization (or uses of more sophisticated intermediate goods production processes) with a special emphasis on an active role for financial and industrial market structures.
Economies where market structures are endogenous typically exhibit multiple equilibria which is the basis for explaining both empirical regularities mentioned above.
Recent theoretical work of financial intermediation and economic development has examined various roles played by the financial sector to justify the emergence of financial intermediaries.
3 For instance, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bencivenga and Smith (1991) stress the liquidity management role of banks: by converting liquid funds into longer term investments, financial intermediation improves the performance of the real sector. Williamson (1986a) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) highlight the risk pooling and monitoring functions of financial intermediaries: by pooling savings for diversified investment projects and monitoring the behavior of the borrowing firms, banks ensure higher expected rates of returns. One common theme of these papers is that financial intermediaries provide access to the benefits of pooled funds and economies of scale. 4 We take up this theme and assume financial intermediaries' primary role is to pool household funds that are directly loaned to producers, because individuals 3 5 Also, fixed bank setup cost exceed average wealth. Thus, individuals must pool their funds in order to pay the fixed cost and be able to gain access to banking services. We do not consider the possibility that fixed costs of forming coalitions may exceed potential profits. 6 An exception is Williamson (1986b) who analyzes how the monopoly power of a fixed number of banks affects real activity and how the number of households may have external effects on the operation of the financial sector. Also, Allen and Gale (1993) analyze the effects of imperfect competition on financial markets. However, their emphasis is on risk-sharing and financial instruments while banks are not explicitly analyzed.
have too little wealth to finance projects by themselves or diversify away firm-specific risks. 5 However, as Stiglitz (1993) and others have remarked, the literature has overlooked that markets with economies of scale can be imperfectly competitive.
6 This neglect may be innocuous when thinking about countries where there are many small banks, but it is less so for many countries where there exist few large banks. In contrast, our paper considers the endogenous determination of market structure for both the real and the financial sectors. Thus, we depart from the previous literature by allowing both real and financial sectors to be monopolistically competitive in the sense of Chamberlin. Intermediate goodsproducing start-ups have fixed setup costs, which imply increasing returns and justify the construction of a monopolistically competitive intermediate goods sector. Similarly, financial intermediaries pay fixed setup costs and act monopolistically competitive in the loan market; their number, too, is determined endogenously. Thus, market structures and competitiveness in both sectors are endogenous, determined by exogenous intermediation and production costs as well as other preference and technology parameters.
Greater competitiveness in product and financial markets is equivalent to a greater variety or sophistication of products and services. Variety can be thought of as one form of profit-driven innovation, an idea familiar from the endogenous growth literature. As in neo-Schumpeterian endogenous growth models, greater variety or competition in the product market directly increases aggregate production. As Romer (1986) notes the effect is formally indistinguishable from an externality. While not critical for our main results, we also allow financial market competition to increase production possibilities. However, we 4 7 Similarly, Aghion and Howitt (1992) assume externalities from innovations affect production costs. However, in their model innovations are variable cost-reducing. 8 The thick-market externality is different than Diamond's (1982) trade or search externalities. We show later that the multiplicity originates from monopolistic competition, not from the externality.
posit that this occurs indirectly by lowering producers ' fixed costs. 7 This externality can be thought of in many ways. For instance, much financial innovation shows up as new services or instruments that transform firms' cost structure from sunk costs to variable costs, leasing being a notable example.
Alternatively, with greater competition comes improved access to loan services, more public information and reduced search costs all of which lower the up-front costs to producers. Finally, more financial intermediaries can be thought of as reducing the aggregate probability of being denied a loan thus lowering the cost of obtaining funds.
A central concern of the present paper is how the "industrial organization" of the banking and production sectors influences real and financial development. We show that the competitiveness of intermediate goods producers has two opposing effects on intermediate goods production. On the one hand, more goods market competition produces a "market-induced demand" effect that increases the size of investment loans; on the other, more competition creates an "intermediate-goods mark-up" effect that reduces loan sizes. The two opposing effects are a primary reason for the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria in our model. The competitiveness of financial intermediaries affects the competitiveness of intermediate goods producers mainly through production costs, which works in two conflicting ways.
Market structures in both sectors are linked, because, for one, financial intermediaries exercise market power as a lender to start-ups in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, more financial market competition has a positive "financial mark-up" effect on variable costs by narrowing the spread between lending and borrowing rates. Alternatively, more competition has a negative external effect on fixed costs by reducing the setup costs of intermediate goods firms, which can be referred to as the "thick-market externality" effect.
8 Thus, the industrial organization of banking and production sectors becomes an integral part of the 5 However, financial market thickness does increase the likelihood of indeterminacy.
dynamic interactions between financial and real activities through these four channels.
The main focus of our paper is the characterization of steady-state equilibria with a financially intermediated production. In particular, we examine how preference, technology and cost parameters affect the degree of financial deepening and production specialization, the loan-deposit interest spread, and the saving rate, as well as the entry of intermediate good and banking firms. We show the properties of the multiple equilibria vary with the degree of sophistication in the intermediate goods production process.
More specifically, for a more developed economy, technological advances result in production specialization and financial deepening and discourage banking competition, whereas banking development that reduces the costs of financial intermediation narrows the interest rate spread, leading to production specialization and financial deepening, encouraging banking competition and reducing the size of loans.
For a less developed economy, some of these findings may change, thus explaining the "stage-dependent financial development" observation. Moreover, our results suggest that the degree of competitiveness of the product market compared to that of the financial market depends on the stage of development with a negative correlation found in developed economies and a positive correlation in less developed economies.
This provides a theoretical explanation for the "heterogenous market structures" observation. Finally, we find that the relationships between financial deepening, the saving ratio, and real output may also vary, depending on the competitiveness of the intermediate goods sector.
II. THE MODEL
There are three sectors. The final goods sector produces a single final good from two sources.
The first source is output from a "traditional" technology that is a linear function of productive capital.
The second source of output is a "modern" technology employing reproducible intermediate goods as specified in Romer (1986) in which the breadth of intermediate products enhances output. The first source 6 9 Without loss of generality, this paper focuses primarily on the behavior of banks, because banks are typically the sole financial agents in LDCs and are also very important even in advanced economies. Mayer (1990) shows, among eight industrialized countries during 1970-85, intermediated loans were the dominant source of external funds, generally contributing a greater share of external financing than shortterm securities, bonds and shares combined. Thus, throughout the paper, we will use the terms "bank" and "financial intermediary" interchangeably. of output acts as an outlet for savings and a source of consumption when the modern technology is not feasible. The modern technology can be an engine of economic development through increases in the number of intermediate goods that can be regarded as enabling a sophisticated production process with increased specialization. It is feasible to produce with the modern technology once a fixed setup cost is paid. While the composition of savings matters for development, we focus on equilibria where individuals have moved from direct capital accumulation via the traditional sector to financially intermediated accumulation via the modern sector. Thus, we introduce the non-intermediated "traditional" sector simply to establish conditions under which financial intermediation emerges.
An intermediate goods firm can produce only after it pays a fixed start-up cost. Intermediate goods are produced using bank-financed capital according to a decreasing-returns technology that permits a positive markup to cover the start-up cost. Banks pool risks by offering households a safe rate of return on the interest-bearing portion of their deposit. They also pool household funds to finance the fixed start-up costs of the intermediate goods firms.
The financial intermediary sector is also monopolistically competitive. There is a fixed cost for setting up a bank. Individual banks can affect their lending rates to the intermediate goods producers, but competition 7 10 We do not consider market power of the intermediary vis-à-vis households for analytical tractability. Williamson (1986b) imposes a similar assumption based on the observation that there are few substitutes for intermediary loans but many for intermediary deposits (such as government securities). That is, individual banks have monopoly power only over the market for loans and act as price-takers in the market for deposits. forces them to break even.
10 By allowing monopolistic competition in both the intermediate goods and
banking sectors, we can relate financial deepening to production specialization.
Households choose a path of consumption of a single good, shares of productive capital in the traditional sector, and the amount of funds to be deposited with the banking sector. During any particular period, banks determine the total amount of funds lent to the intermediate goods sector at the same time they set the interest rate on deposits but prior to realization of the random output shocks in the intermediate goods sector. This is possible because banks are assumed to know the distribution of shocks and returns.
After the uncertainty in the intermediate goods sector is resolved, the amount of intermediate goods production is determined, after which final goods are produced.
At this point we want to emphasize that the traditional sector exists simply to establish a rate-ofreturns-dominancy condition under which the financial sector emerges. It is not the purpose of this paper to study the development process from traditional to modern production technology. Rather, the focus of the paper is to understand the steady-state properties of the financially intermediated equilibrium. Second, idiosyncratic risks in the intermediate goods sector help justify the active role of banks in addition to banks' funds-pooling function. Our handling of the uncertainty aspect is in a barebone fashion to focus on the characterization of a symmetric, certainty-equivalent equilibrium. The main emphasis of the paper is to highlight the role of endogenous market structures of the intermediate goods and the financial sectors.
We characterize the optimizing behavior of households, banks, intermediate goods producers, and final good producers, respectively, in the following subsections. A brief summary of the structure of the model is provided in Figure 1 (with notation to be defined later).
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11 That is, interest rates subscripted period t denote returns from holding instruments between periods t-1 and t.
IIA. Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of mass 1. 
little role in driving any of the results except to produce a simple condition to ensure the emergence of financial intermediation. The modern technology is assumed to take the Romer (1986) 
with which is a strictly concave production function that is
The Dixit-Stiglitz type constant-returns-to-scale form will always produce a constant mark-up, independent of economic activity.
13 A similar assumption below will ensure that no individual can internally finance the production of intermediate goods. These assumptions highlight the funds pooling role of financial intermediaries, which has been supported historically by the emergence of the informal "rotating savings and credit association" (ROSCA). See Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) . in the modern sector gives rise to a simple analysis of a non-trivial mark-up. 12 We also assume that there is a fixed cost associated with production of the final good, , which exceeds the wealth of any single S y individual. The existence of this cost prevents any one individual from owning a final-goods producing firm.
13
The optimization problem faced by the final goods producer is as follows:
where is given by (2), denotes the price of the i'th intermediate good and we assume that the final y t q t (i) good is the numeraire.
The technology for producing the intermediate goods is given by the following:
where denotes capital allocated to production of the i'th intermediate good, and the production k x t (i) technology is specified as:
. We also assume that there is a fixed cost
associated with the production of the intermediate goods, . One can think of this fixed cost as primarily S x 10 14 We can use N and M to indicate the degree of competitiveness in the corresponding market. Note that since both are measures (rather than cardinalities), pure monopoly requires these values approaching zero (rather than unity). 15 If we reinterpret our start-up cost as the information acquisition cost considered in Williamson (1986b) , then his setup regarding the production fixed cost can be encompassed by our form with .
the establishment cost incurred in starting up a project, x(i), that requires external finance. In other words, it is the cost of putting together the financing needed to operate the i'th intermediate goods investment
project for one period. Furthermore, this cost is assumed to depend on the number of monopolistic banks.
Specifically, an increase in the number of banks ( ) will intensify financial market thickness and M t financial innovation that reduce the resources needed to put together the financing for intermediate goods production. 14 Accordingly, we hypothesize that the fixed cost has the form .
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In short, this consideration captures the Diamond-like thick-market externality in a different context.
The profit maximization problem faced by the typical intermediate goods producer is as follows:
where the technology for producing is specified as in (4) and is the gross unit cost of capital
(i.e., the cost from the principle and the interest of the bank loan).
For simplicity, we assume that has a stationary distribution with two possible realizations A x t (i) with and where
and . Denote the certainty equivalent value of as . In the steady-state analysis
below, we will consider only the symmetric, certainty-equivalent equilibrium allocation, which enables us to focus on the relationships between financial deepening and production specialization. Throughout the paper, we will refer to an increase in as a positive technological shock and will assume that the bank A knows the distribution that generates the outcomes of this process but not the individual realizations of 1 across firms. This ex-ante uncertainty about the outcomes of investment projects is used only to 2(i) 11 16 The existence of such a fixed cost is consistent with empirical evidence of financial economies to scale for small banks (Berger et al., 1993 and Clark, 1988 ) and a negative correlation of unit bank costs and financial development (Sussman and Zeira, 1995) . 17 Each bank holds a market portfolio of loans that is not accessible to households unless they can afford to pay the fixed costs. Thus, banks act like a mutual fund. While a stock market could perform the same function, one does not observe widespread direct (and diversified) holding of equities or loans. 18 As Allen (1991) points out, firms tend to have relationships with many financial intermediaries simultaneously. Households also have simultaneous relationships although maybe to a lesser extent.
motivate the existence of financial intermediation and is inessential to our main points.
IIC. The banking sector
Households make deposits with banks that are then lent to firms in the intermediate goods sector.
The bank's profit maximization problem is as follows:
subject to the balance sheet constraint
Here denotes the unit cost of processing a loan to the i'th intermediate goods industry, while is the µ(i) S b fixed cost incurred to set up and run a bank. 16 Note that with the balance sheet identity (7), it is a matter of indifference whether we specify the bank's profit function using gross or net rates of interest. Also, riskneutral banks pool loans with firm-specific risks to achieve risk diversification. gives:
III. OPTIMIZATION
We characterize the equilibrium using the first-order conditions for each sector's optimization problem. First, from the Final Goods Sector we obtain the following first-order conditions for an interior equilibrium:
These conditions plus the assumptions of free entry and symmetry (such that for all and thus
where for convenience we have dropped all time subscripts. To ensure that intermediate goods production 13 20 Notice that under the Romer-type technology (which differs from the Dixit-Stiglitz form), the elasticity is no longer fixed. 21 Optimization with monopoly power implies:
.
is positive, we assume . Substituting (11) 
In obtaining the first equality, we have imposed ex post symmetry for the intermediate goods firms. Under symmetry, the free entry condition for the intermediate goods sector is simply .
Combining equation (13) production and the gross loan rate: 
, which proves the claim.
As monopoly power of the individual firms increases or as the elasticity of demand falls (lower or ), " D the mark-up of each intermediate goods producer increases, thus allowing for a higher loan rate while maintaining zero profit.
Equating demand for intermediate goods from (11) and supply from (14) yields an expression for the equilibrium number of intermediate goods firms
The (ex-ante) first-order conditions of the Banking Sector are where is the inverse of the interest rate elasticity of the demand for
bank loans. It can be shown that the financial mark-up (of the loan rate over the deposit rate) is . 22 The mark-up term is inversely related to the bank's degree of market
power, since as goes to infinity, goes to zero. Using this to replace the mark-up term in ( . In a perfectly competitive framework , the mark-ups of (r
the firms are driven to zero and the loan-deposit interest rate differential is nothing but the unit loan
processing cost, . µ
Equations (6), (7), (8) and (19) can be combined to yield:
Before proceeding we might note that we can get a preview of some of our main results from an examination of equations (17) and (20). Recall that equation (17) To close the system we assume that the returns from the intermediate goods (or "high tech") sector
16
23 This assumption also implies that in the steady-state equilibrium there will be no output produced by means of the "traditional" technology and all output will be intermediated. 
which can be combined to yield
We can now summarize all optimization, feasibility, technology and free entry conditions to define an interior, financially intermediated equilibrium,
Definition 1. An equilibrium with financial intermediation (EFI) is a tuple of positive quantities and prices satisfying:
{c t , b t , x t , k x t ; y t , D t , L t , N t , M t ; r b t , r k t ,q t } t$0 (i) (
consumer optimization and budget constraints) equations (22) and (23); (ii) (final-good producer optimization and technology) equations (2) and (10); (iii) (intermediate-goods producer optimization, technology and free entry) equations (14)-(16); (iv) (bank optimization, free entry and balance sheet conditions) equations (8a), (8b), (18), (20) and (21); (v) (active financial intermediation) .
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IV. STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will focus only on characterizing the properties of steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation. Consider,
Definition 2. A steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation (SSEFI) is an EFI with all quantities and prices converging to some positive constant values.
Thus, from (24) we obtain the steady-state deposit rate:
where . In the absence of the banking fee, and the steady-state deposit
rate is simply the pure rate of time preference. The steady-state loan rate is then obtained using equations (19) and (25):
where , , , and . Thus, an increase in the consumer
banking fee or the loan processing cost or the mark-up of the intermediate good producers will lead to a higher steady-state loan rate. Equation (11) allows us to write
where iff , and the effect of on is ambiguous. Thus, when
is sufficiently small, an increase in the number of intermediate goods firms lowers the scale of
production for each individual firm.
Utilizing equations (11) and (12), we have the following expression for : q
where iff , and ; again, the sign of is ambiguous.
When is sufficiently small, an increase in raises the marginal product of (and thus ) due to a N N x q lower and a wider range of intermediate products. In this case, the aggregate induced demand effect on x dominates the intermediate-good mark-up effect. In order for the negative markup effect to dominate, a x larger critical value of is required, specifically which is greater than .
To characterize the steady-state value of , we manipulate (17) to obtain M where iff , , , and , while the effect
of is ambiguous. From equation (14), since depends negatively on , the number of banks and the D S Next, substituting (29) into (15) we can derive a relationship between and that consolidates k x N the implications of the free entry assumption:
We can also use equations (16) and (26) to obtain another relationship between and that summarizes k x N the implication of the assumption that production is carried out efficiently:
Finally, it remains to derive the steady-state levels of , , and . From equation (21) ( c, b, D, L ) equations (8a), (8b), (21) 
and (22).
The key task for characterizing the steady-state equilibria is to examine using (30) and (k x , N) (31). For illustrative purposes, we will call the "free entry" relationship, (30), the FE locus and the "production efficiency" relationship, (31), the PE locus (see Figures 4a,b) . It is straightforward to show that the FE locus is U-shaped, with a trough at , and two vertical asymptotes at and
. Equation (15) For fixed , must fall so that the value of the marginal product of capital will increase to maintain N k x equality with the higher rental price. Thus, the PE-locus shifts down and the FE-locus is unaffected.
For sufficiently high , , and , or for sufficiently low and , the two curves will intersect A x e 0 µ S y $ each other twice to produce a high-equilibrium and a low-equilibrium. 26 Since ,
around the high-equilibrium the FE locus must be upward-sloping and the PE locus must be downward-N sloping. However, around the low-equilibrium, while the PE locus must be upward sloping, the slope of N the FE locus could be negative (as in Figure 4a ) or positive (as in Figure 4b ). We will refer to the high-N equilibrium (H) as the benchmark case I and the other two types of equilibria, low-(L in Figure 4a) and N Figure 4b ) as the alternative cases II and III, respectively. Note that even when N and the FE locus is horizontal, cases I and II still arise. Therefore, the thick-market externality only ( ' 0 increases the types of equilibria from two to three by allowing for the intermediate-equilibrium but is not N essential in obtaining multiplicity in the first place. This differs from the financial fragility model of Cooper and Ejarque (1994) in which multiple equilibria occur as a result of the participation externality (in that a larger mass of agents joining the intermediary can lower the fixed setup costs). These results can be summarized by, 
intermediate-(I in

V. COMPARATIVE-STATIC ANALYSIS
We will begin by focusing our attention on the comparative-static results of the benchmark case (see Table 1 ) and relegate our discussion of the alternative cases to the end of this section to contrast with the benchmark case. An autonomous increase in the fixed cost of intermediate goods production, , S x 0 requires a more competitive banking sector to offset its negative effect. Such a change, however, will not affect any other endogenous variables. On the other hand, an increase in the fixed cost of setting up and running a banking firm, , reduces the profit margin and thus discourages bank entry. Again, it has no S b effect on any other endogenous variables, in contrast with the Cournot solution in the oligopolistic competition model of Williamson (1986b) where a higher banking fixed cost only widens the loan-deposit interest rate spread to ensure profitability without changing the number of banks. Furthermore, an increase in the fixed cost of final goods production, , has a direct positive effect on capital and intermediate Thus, production technological advances result in a larger number of intermediate goods (product-27 With any shock and across all equilibria, we obtain a positive correlation between financial development and the saving rate, . More generally, as Pagano (1993) argues, the correlation (1&e 0 )Nk x /y between intermediation and savings may be sensitive to how intermediation is modeled and where shocks occur. For instance, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that economies with intermediation need not have higher savings rates than economies without it. Such a comparison is left for future research because in our model this would involve comparing savings with a traditional sector and savings with a modern sector. ion specialization), an ambiguous effect on the financial intermediation ratio (financial deepening as measured by the total intermediated loans to output ratio), but it discourages banking competition at the same time it encourages competition among intermediate goods producers. Thus, the positive correlation between production specialization and financial deepening that has been observed by Goldsmith (1969) , McKinnon (1973) , Shaw (1973) , and King and Levine (1993) need not obtain a priori for technology shocks. However, the model does predict a positive correlation for bank cost shocks. Banking development that reduces the effective cost of financial intermediation will narrow the loan-deposit interest rate differential, discourage banking competition, and induce production specialization and financial deepening.
Thus, the finding of Sussman and Zeira (1995) that the cost of financial intermediation falls as per capita output rises may be a result of bank development, and the direction of causation is theoretically indeterminate.
Moreover, banking development results in a negative correlation between the number of banks and the size of loan, consistent with the empirical findings in Petersen and Rajan (1994) note that all three types of equilibria may be dynamically stable and that it may be possible to have the high-N equilibrium Pareto-dominate the other two in views of the consumers. Whether an economy ends up with one particular type of equilibrium will be history-dependent, relying on economic as well as institutional factors, and influenced by individual expectations, based on self-fulfilling prophecies. We will not discuss the detailed comparative statics under the two alternative cases (see Tables 2a and 2b ). Instead, we will highlight a few interesting findings contrasting with the benchmark case.
On the one hand, while a positive shock to production technology increases output for all three equilibria, it results in a lower degree of production specialization for both of the alternative cases, contrary to the benchmark case. Moreover, the number of banks is lower (higher) in case II (III). Thus, one observes a parallel market structure for the real and financial sectors in the low-N case but a dissimilar market structure for the two sectors in the other two cases (high-N and intermediate-). On the other hand, a N positive shock to the financial technology (say lower banking fees or loan processing costs) leads to a lower degree of production specialization and lower net output for both of the alternative cases. The number of banks is lower (higher) for case II (III). As a consequence, the positive correlation between financial intermediation and real activities is possibly negative in the low-equilibrium, which explains the stage-N dependent financial development observation. Finally, while a positive correlation between the financial intermediation ratio and the saving rate holds for all cases, the relationship between real output and saving may be negative (in the low-case and in the intermediate-case for ).
These results are summarized by the following: 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model with technological frictions that arise when transforming savings into investment. The banking sector emerges endogenously to facilitate pooling of funds to overcome indivisibilities and to diversify borrower-specific risks. We depart from the previous literature by allowing both financial and real sectors to be monopolistically competitive in the sense of Chamberlin. We prove the existence of the steady-state equilibrium with a financially intermediated production process and examine how preference, technology, and setup and loan processing cost parameters affect the degree of financial deepening and product specialization, the saving rate, the loan-deposit interest spread, and the entry of intermediate goods and financial firms. We also show the possibility of multiple equilibria associated with different degrees of sophistication in the intermediate goods production process.
Our results suggest that, for a more developed economy, technological advances result in production specialization and financial deepening and discourage banking competition, whereas banking development that reduces the effective costs of financial intermediation narrows the interest rate spread, leading to 27 production specialization and financial deepening, encouraging banking competition and reducing the size of loans. For a less developed economy, some of the results will change, thus explaining why the correlation between financial and real activity varies across different stages of economic development, i.e., the "stage-dependent financial development" observation. Moreover, we find that, despite the positive correlation between the financial intermediation ratio and the saving rate in the less developed economy cases, real and financial activity may be negatively related. In fact, one of the provocative insights to come from this analysis is that economic development, financial deepening, and bank sector competitiveness are all nonmonotonically related to one another, which generates testable empirical implications, in particular for understanding the role endogenous market structures played in financial and economic development and for providing plausible explanation of the "heterogeneous market structure" observation.
Finally, we note that the positive relationship between the financial intermediation ratio and the saving rate in the benchmark case need not hold in short-run transition to the steady state. Specifically, our comparative statics are derived around the steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation in which the traditional sector vanishes. In the short run, an industrial transformation from the traditional to the modern sector accompanied by financial deepening would create a negative wealth effect on the rate of aggregate savings due to the presence of startup costs for intermediated production, which may offset the positive induced saving effect. For future work, it may be interesting to explore the underlying transitional dynamics to compare with observed financial sector evolving processes. To our knowledge, there are only two studies of transitional dynamics -- Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Chen, Chiang and Wang (1996) . However, neither consider market imperfections. Of course, in so doing, one must simplify greatly the structure of the model in order to produce any analytical results. Moreover, one may extend our framework to reexamine the welfare effects of monetary policy with an active banking sector. In particular, the degree of financial deepening and production specialization may now be sensitive to changes in the money growth rate and imposition of an interest rate ceiling. 3. Case I corresponds to the "H" equilibrium in Figure 4a . Note: Case II corresponds to the "L" equilibrium in Figure 4a . 
